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I
INTRODUCTION: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF JURIES
Liability for personal injury has become big business.' According to some,
it is also a rotten business. 2 At the head of the long line of complainants
stands the medical profession, objecting that doctors and hospitals are too
often unfairly singled out to pay excessive damages.3
By far the most common type of liability case is the automobile tort.4
Thus, automobile cases (of course omitting claims for property damage) are
the natural benchmark against which to compare other types of personal
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1. Robert W. Sturgis, Tort Cost Trends: An International Perspective 12 (Tillinghast, a Towers
Perrin Company, 1989) (over 2.5% of GNP in the United States for 1987 compared to about 0.5%
elsewhere in the developed world);James S. Kakalik & Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in
Tort Litigation vi and vii, at 74, Fig 7.2 (RAND, 1986) (R-3391-ICJ) (total cost of tort lawsuits
terminated in 1985 between $29 and $36 billion) ("Costs and Compensation").
2. See, for example, Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 4 (Basic
Books, 1988) (very critical of annual liability "tax" of at least $80 billion, perhaps as high as $300
billion); Jeffrey O'Connell & C. Brian Kelly, The Blame Game: Injuries, Insurance, and Injustice
(Lexington Books, 1987).
3. See, for example, Am Med Ass'n, A Proposed Alternative to the Civil Justice System for Resolving
Medical Liability Disputes: A Fault-Based, Administrative System (January 1988) ("A Proposed Alternative");
Am Med Ass'n, Professional Liability in the "80s, reports 1-3 (October 1984, November 1984, March
1985).
4. See, for example, Kakalik & Pace, Costs and Compensation at 14, Table 2.4 (cited in note 1)
(estimated 478,000 automobile cases or 55% of state court tort filings, and 7,000 or 17% in federal
courts, which attract higher-value cases).
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injury claims. Automotive, medical, and the many other types of litigable
injuries are all assessed by essentially the same system of tort law and liability
insurance. 5 The core of this entire enterprise is the hallowed American
institution of the civil jury. Juries resolve only a small share of claims, but
their decisions greatly influence the far more numerous settlement
negotiations among plaintiffs, defense counsel, and insurance claims
adjusters. 6
A major complaint of well-insured defendants, especially physicians, is that
juries are biased against defendants, especially those with "deep pockets." 7
This availability of funds allegedly encourages easier awards of higher
damages for similar injuries and hence the bringing of less meritorious claims.
These concerns find some empirical support in the work of analysts at
RAND.8 On the other side of the issue stand the trial lawyers and some
consumer advocates. 9
The policy issue at stake is whether society should accept the system's
current performance, further reform its operations, or replace the system
altogether. An additional issue is whether any legal changes should apply to
all types of personal injury or whether there are good reasons for singling out
medical malpractice.
If true, the physicians' complaints ofjury bias provide one justification for
malpractice-specific reform, akin to almost all of the tort reforms enacted in
the mid-1970s.1 0 The 1980s' reforms were more apt to be generic, that is,
to cover all personal injury lawsuits or all torts, rather than only medical
malpractice." Although organized medicine has joined in coalitions to
5. William Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on Torts (West, 5th ed 1984) ("Prosser &
Keeton").
6. See, for example, Stephen Daniels & Lori Andrews, The Shadow of the Law: Jury Decisions in
Obstetrics and Gynecology Cases, in Victoria P. Rostow & Roger J. Bulger, eds, 2 Medical Professional
Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care: An Interdisciplinary Review (Nat'l Acad Press, 1989) ("The
Shadow of the Low"); H. Laurence Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims
Adjustment (Aldine, 2d ed 1980) ("Settled Out of Court"). See also discussion of settlement model
below, at notes 20-37.
7. See, for example, James K. Hammitt, Stephen J. Carroll & Daniel A. Relies, Tort Standards
and Jury Decisions, 14 J Legal Stud 751, 754 n8 (1985).
8. For example, Audrey Chin & Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in Cook
County Jury Trials (RAND, 1985) (R-3249-ICJ); Mark A. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries: Civil Jury
Verdicts in Cook County 35 (RAND, 1984) (R-301 I-ICJ) (average malpractice or other "high stakes"
injury receives jury verdict ten to thirteen times higher than average automobile injury, some four
times higher controlling for the severity of injury and other factors) (cited by Am Med Ass'n, A
Proposed Alternative at 10 (cited in note 3); Hammitt, Carroll & Relies, 14J Legal Stud at 753-56 (cited
in note 7)).
9. See, for example, Tony C. Dunningham & Robin Lane, Malpractice-The Illusory Crisis, 54 Fla
Bar J 114 (1980); Thomas Goddard, The American Mfedical Association is Wrong-There is No Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis (unpublished paper for the Public Affairs Dep't, Ass'n Trial Lawyers of
America, issued 1985); The Needfoi Disciplinary Reform, Not Tort Reform (Public Citizens Health Res
Group, 1985) (press release).
10. See, for example, Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Malpractice Crisis,
1975 Duke LJ 1417; Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 Md L
Rev 489 (1977).
11. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary
Report Card, 22 UC Davis L Rev 499 (1989).
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promote generic tort reform, since the late 1980s the American Medical
Association ("AMA") and medical specialty societies have pressed to treat
malpractice cases separately. Their plan would remove medical liability from
the civil justice system, for resolution under modified rules through an
administrative process.' 2 How, if at all, to effect reform still ranks high on
both state and federal agendas, despite the recent return to normalcy in
liability insurance markets.
This article documents how jury verdicts for malpractice and other "deep
pocket" personal injury defendants (products liability and government cases)
compare with ordinary defendants (automobile torts) and analyzes possible
explanations for observed differences. The dynamics of litigation and the
probability of winning are also addressed, as well as change over time. The
data come from jury verdicts reported in five different states, combining data
previously computerized by RAND researchers with similarly compiled
information by the authors (see Appendix 1). We assess jury verdicts in these
selected types of cases as a lens to focus on the larger issues of jury
performance and extra-judicial reform.
The data show that juries do better than their critics allege, although costs
of litigation are very high. Most of the observed variation in valuation of
injury is explained by logical factors such as severity of injury and age of
claimant. Other observed factors equal, however, malpractice cases do
receive higher awards. Yet the difference does not seem to result from across-
the-board jury bias or antipathy to doctors, as physicians contend, for most
malpractice "awards" are zero, quite unlike most automobile awards. Nor
does the lawyers' perspective seem supportable, that malpractice injuries are
objectively worse in ways not captured by current data. Rather, a more
persuasive hypothesis to explain the variation in valuation of injury is that
plaintiffs' lawyers disproportionately select for trial cases of uncertain liability
where subjective damages are higher (for example, nonpecuniary loss by
sympathetic claimant). The policy conclusion is that problems in damage
valuations need to be addressed across the board, not for malpractice cases
alone. Problems in jury assessments of medical negligence or causation may
justify malpractice-specific reform, but the case is not strong based on errors
in damages.
II
FROM INJURY TO JURY: UNDERSTANDING How CASES
PROCEED TO TRIAL
Fully understanding jury verdicts calls for understanding how claimants
and lawyers select cases for trial. Juries see only a small proportion of all
malpractice and other disputes. Though these selected cases are not typical,
their results greatly influence settlements. This article assumes the following
12. Am Med Ass'n, A Proposed Alternative (cited in note 3).
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model of dispute resolution and legal behavior, from the underlying injury to
jury verdict, in analyzing juries' valuations of different types of lawsuits.
A. From Injury to Claim or Lawsuit
It is axiomatic that every personal injury lawsuit begins with an injury, real
or imagined. So dispute resolution starts with a pool of injuries from various
causes, for example, automobile accidents, slips and falls on public premises,
defective products, or medical negligence. The size of this pool can only be
estimated.' 3 There is no shortage of suggestions, often from high-ranking
sources, 14 that America is a "litigious society." Yet most incidents of mal-
practice, at least, never become claims or lawsuits.' 5 How injured parties
decide whether to pursue a claim or lawsuit is not well understood, 16 although
states' legal regimes have been empirically shown to influence the rate of
malpractice claims,' 7 and economic, social, and other factors are surely
13. Data on injury (as opposed to claims) come from such sources as statutorily required
reporting of motor vehicle accidents, hospital emergency room reporting, and special surveys. Two
published studies have estimated the extent of malpractice injury, at least for hospital incidents,
which give rise to most claims, at about 1% of hospitalizations. Don Harper Mills, John S. Boyden,
Jr. & David S. Rubsamen, Report on the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study 97-101 (Sutter, 1977)
(sponsored jointly by the California Medical and Hospital Associations) (rate of 0.8% estimated for
California hospitals in 1974), summarized in Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study: A
Technical Summary, 128 WestJ Med 360 (1978); Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and
Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York 3, 6-1 (February
1990) (1.0% rate for New York hospitals in 1984) ("New York Study"). Over 30 million
hospitalizations occur nationally each year, US Dep't Commerce, 1989 Statistical Abstract of the United
States Table 161, so that some 300,000 negligent hospital injuries can be expected.
14. See, for example, Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 Am Bar Ass'nJ 274 (1982);
Tort Policy Working Group, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy
Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability (US Dep't Justice, 1986).
15. Negligent hospital injuries outnumber claims by a factor of eight or ten to one, according to
data from the two hospital-injury studies. Don Harper Mills, Comments on Where We Stand and What We
Know, presented at the Urban Institute conference, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find
Relief, Washington, D.C. (February 21, 1985) (10:1 ratio for California in 1974); Patricia M. Danzon,
Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy 20-25 (Harvard U Press, 1985) (estimating 5:1
ratio for California in 1984 based on growth in claims since 1974) ("Medical Malpractice"); New York
Study at 7-24 to 7-41 (cited in note 13) (8:1 ratio for New York in 1984).
16. The classic case-study analysis, Roger Bryant Hunting & Gloria S. Neuwirth, Who Sues in New
York City (Columbia U Press, 1962), considered automobile victims' losses, experience, attitudes, and
background. Subsequent research, much of it in the law and society literature, focuses on
demographics and other background concerns. For example, William L.F. Felsteiner, Richard L.
Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming... 15 L &
Soc'y Rev 631, 640 (1980-81); Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women: An
Empirical Analysis, 62 Notre Dame L Rev 6 (1986); Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An
Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 L & Soc'y Rev 427 (1977). There seems to have been little empirical
examination of the role of first-party or social insurance coverage, which pays for most damages from
injury. Alfred F. Conard, et al, Automobile Accident Costs and Payments: Studies in the Economics of Injury
Reparation 17 (U Mich Press, 1964). On the paucity of malpractice evidence, see generally Stephen
Zuckerman, Christopher F. Koller & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Information on Malpractice: A Review of
Empirical Research on Major Policy Issues, 49 L & Contemp Probs 85, 94-97 (Spring 1986); Marlynn L.
May & Laura DeMarco, Patients and Doctors Disputing: Patients' Complaints and What They Do About Them,
24 L & Soc'y Rev 105 (1990).
17. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Cases, 27 J L & Econ 115
(1984) (analyzing inter alia how many "pro-plaintiff" common law developments had occurred in
each jurisdiction).
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involved as well.' 8 Victims of automobile accidents, for example, appear
more likely than victims of malpractice to consult a lawyer.' 9
B. Lawyers' Decisionmaking: Settlement versus Litigation to Trial
Whatever motivates injured parties, it is also axiomatic that plaintiffs'
attorneys greatly influence what litigation is filed, settled, and tried.
Claimants need lawyers, and lawyers screen cases for legal merit and
economic return. One survey found that, nationally, all lawyers refuse seven
of eight malpractice cases brought to them for evaluation. 20  Plaintiffs'
lawyers' contingent fees make them not merely disinterested purveyors of
expert legal services but also "investors" in their clients' causes, so they are
well motivated to consider expected returns. Lawyers' decisionmaking on
behalf of their clients has been the subject of much legal writing as well as
social science analysis, discussed next. 2 '
The standard social science analysis models resolution of each case as a
bargaining game: the two competing, self-interested sides are risk neutral and
consider the expected economic impact on them at every stage. 22 Claimants
and their lawyers2 3 maximize their net return (settlement or award less
expenses), while defendants, insurers, and their lawyers minimize their total
18. Donald N. DeWees, Michael J. Trebilcock & Peter C. Coyte, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A
Comparative Empirical Perspective, 54 L & Contemp Probs 217 (Winter 1991).
19. See All-Industry Research Advisory Council, Attorney Involvement in Auto Injury Claims 9-11
(1988) (95% of families with automobile personal injury in 1986 filed automobile insurance claims,
including no-fault; 35% hired attorneys, a good indicator of a tort claim) ("Attorney Involvement"). In
contrast, one malpractice study of patients' self-reported "negative medical care experiences" found
that fully 42% of respondents' families had had at least one such experience, almost 17% within the
last year. Of these, 63% sought further medical care as a result, but only 8% sought legal advice-
listing both pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivations in equal measure. Active consideration of
seeking legal advice was most strongly associated with measures of the amount of damage or injury.
Mark A. Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and Attitudes toward Medical Malpractice, in Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice Appendix, 658 (1973) (OS
73-89) ("Consumer's Knowledge").
20. Lawyers with a significant malpractice case load, however, accepted a much higher share (in
part, one supposes, because of prior screening of some cases by referring attorneys). The main
reason for rejection was "no perceived liability." Stephen Dietz, C. Bruce Baird & Lawrence Berul,
The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Report of the Secretary's
Commission on Medical Malpractice Appendix, 87, 97-100 (1973) (OS 73-89).
21. See, for example, Melvin W. Reder, Contingent Fees in Litigation with Special Reference to Medical
Malpractice, in Simon Rottenberg, ed, The Economics of Medical Malpractice 211 (Am Enterprise Inst,
1978); see generally Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L & Soc'y Rev 95 (1974); Patricia M. Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14
BellJ Econ 213 (Spring 1983).
22. For a review of the literature, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld. Economic Analysis
of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J Econ Lit 1067 (1989). Traditional applications of the model.
however, often considered the alternatives "settle" versus "trial" only at one decision point, whether
to settle or go to trial. A newer approach analogizes a legal claim to an "option," which can be
"sold" at any time and whose value changes as new information becomes available. This is more
consistent with the legal reality of continuous decisionmaking at every stage. See Bradford Cornell,
The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J Legal Stud 173-87 (1990).
23. Lawyers are assumed to act in their clients' interests. This assumption eliminates principal-
agent conflicts. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 L & Contemp
Probs 139 (Winter 1984).
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loss (settlement or award plus expenses). 24 Lawyers (and insurers) estimate
each plaintiff's probability of winning and, if won, the probable level of
damages. Estimates are based on knowledge of the applicable legal rules of
liability and damages, investigation of the circumstances and nature of injury
(for example, extent of wage and medical losses, residual disability, pain and
suffering), and informed judgment about likely jury behavior. The model's
assumptions are intuitively plausible and have served a number of formal
analyses.
Using these and other simplifying assumptions, it follows that claims will
be settled whenever the difference between the two sides' respective
valuations of the case (perceived likelihood of liability times likely damages) is
less than the (normally considerable 25) expense of pursuing the case to a legal
conclusion (jury verdict, potentially followed by judicial appeal). Otherwise
stated, the defendant's maximum offer at any time is his then-expected value
of verdict plus marginal litigation expense, whereas the plaintiff's minimum
demand, or asking price, is her expected value less marginal litigation
expense. The precise amount of the settlement between the two sides'
valuations is determined by the parties' relative bargaining power, which
probably varies with legal talent and experience, resources available to finance
litigation, and other factors. 26  The standard model may be altered by
assuming risk aversion2 7 or asymmetric information. For instance, on the
defense side, manufacturers or physicians probably know more about the
potential for proving negligence than do claimants or their lawyers. 28 On the
plaintiff's side, claimants probably know most about their own injuries. Of
course, the legal process of pretrial discovery is meant to minimize
informational imbalances, traditionally on the rationale of avoiding surprise at
trial. Economic externalities (for example, "spillover" effects of one
settlement on future cases 29 ) or non-pecuniary motives (for example, a
plaintiff's personal vengeance or a defendant's concern about reputation) can
also complicate the model. Strategic behavior may also occur, as where
"nuisance suits" are brought solely to force a settlement. 30
24. The model has been developed over time. Leading presentations include William M.
Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61 (1971); John P. Gould, The Economics of
Legal Conflicts, 2 J Legal Stud 279 (1973); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 434-53 (Little,
Brown, 2d ed 1977); and Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, II J Legal Stud 55 (1982). See also note 22.
25. For the only known published calculation of the marginal expense of going to trial, see
Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 L & Contemp Probs 43,
56-59 (Winter 1991).
26. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensation
for Bodily Injury, 15J Legal Stud 321 (1986). See generally sources cited in note 24.
27. For example, W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17J Legal Stud 101
(1988).
28. See, for example, Patricia M. Danzon, Liability and Liability Insurance for Mledical Malpractice, 4 J
Health Econ 309, 312-14 (1985); Ivan P. L. P'ng, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, 34 J Pub
Econ 61 (1987).
29. See, for example. Jeffrey M. Pertoff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Settlement in Private Antitrust
Litigation, in Lawrence J. White, ed, Private Antitrust Litigation 149 (MIT Press, 1988).
30. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17J Legal Stud 437 (1988).
[Vol. 54: No. I
Page 5: Winter 1991]
Several implications follow from the standard model: The more variable
the two sides' expectations about jury performance, the less likely are
settlements. The higher the marginal costs of continuing at law, the more
likely are settlements. Asymmetry of information, whether due to inherent
advantage or quality of investigation, increases the likelihood of continuing to
trial. And under rather restrictive assumptions, the model predicts that trials
should result in a 50-50 split in outcomes between plaintiffs' and defendants'
victories. 3' The intuition underlying this prediction is that well-informed,
well-represented, and risk-neutral parties will settle the "obvious" cases, ones
where juries' fact finding and application of the law are relatively predictable
by both sides. Only the "difficult," unpredictable cases can be expected to
proceed to trial (absent such assumed-away factors as vengeance, nuisance
suits, and concern about impact on later similar suits). Further, where two-
sided outcomes are very unpredictable, as in a coin toss, results should favor
each side about equally. It is of course an empirical matter whether the actual
process hews closely to the predictive model or results indeed come out 50-
50.32
It may at first seem counterintuitive that so few, and so atypical, cases
could guide settlements in the far larger number of normal cases. 33 However,
"marginal" transactions regularly set values applicable far beyond the
marginal case. Stockbrokers can "make a market" by trading relatively few
shares of a security, for instance. Real estate appraisals, whether for eminent
domain proceedings, local tax assessment, or second mortgages, are greatly
influenced by the relatively few properties that are actually sold in a recent
period.3 4 Moreover, common sense similarly indicates that jury outcomes
must influence parties' negotiations, for either side can "hold out" for a trial.
There are also practical indications that parties care greatly about jury results;
31. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1, 5
(1984).
32. See discussion below, at notes 75-83, of comparative win percentages adjusted for other
influences. For other results, see sources cited in Metzloff, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 64 & n77 (cited
in note 25).
33. Professor Metzloff, for one, seems skeptical of the guiding role of jury verdicts, especially
with respect to determination of damages. Metzloff, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 84-86, 88-92 (cited in
note 25).
34. These observations do not mean that jury verdicts directly set the "going rate" in the same
sense that stock market transactions do, for jury cases are atypical, not identical to settled ones. But
responsible people often base valuations on information about non-identical "sales," as when the
price received for a four-bedroom brick Colonial on the corner affects the perceived value of the
three-bedroom clapboard Cape Cod down the block. In an analogy perhaps closer to home for a
legal footnote, salaries set by a single Wall Street law firm for beginning associates can not only
directly affect competing similar firms but also can indirectly influence many or most recruiting
salaries thereafter. Similarly, prior jury results, along with prior settlement outcomes, indirectly
affect settlements as the negotiating parties argue various analogies and distinctions from this
imperfect "precedent." Jury verdicts do not represent the "gold standard" of valuation in the same
way as does, say, an organized futures market in other types of contingent claims (for example, the
right to buy or sell 1,000 ounces of precious metal next December 12th). Instead, in an economic
sense, "fair market value" is set by free negotiation between willing plaintiff and willing defendant.
Sometimes negotiation fails, however. Then, juries take over, so parties are constantly cognizant of
what a jury might do.
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for example, lawyers subscribe to jury verdict reporters, 35 insurers worry
about cases of first impression and their likely effect on future claims, and
insurers have been known to revalue claims reserves in response to observed
shifts. 36 Descriptions of dispute resolution also note the influence of
expected jury values on parties' negotiations about settlements. 3 7
C. Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Markets in Equilibrium
Viewing a plaintiffs' lawyer's practice in its entirety as an "investor" in
various contingent claims, we assume that the practice "invests" so as to
maximize overall net returns on a "portfolio" of personal injury (and other)
cases. The practice accepts or rejects personal injury cases of various types on
their separate merits. 38 We assume that contingent fees proportional to the
amount awarded apply across types of cases and cover all legal costs
(including the lawyer's own time), although we recognize that some separately
billed expenses may be large in an unknown number of lawyer-client
contracts. When the plaintiff wins a case, the plaintiff's lawyer earns a net
return equal to the difference between the contingent fee and the cost of
litigation (including the opportunity cost of their time). When the plaintiff
loses, the lawyer incurs a financial loss equal to the cost of litigation. In the
aggregate, the practice must meet the costs of lost cases out of the gains on
the winners. So the level of return on won cases required to be competitive
varies with the percentage of cases won as well as with the cost of that type of
litigation.
Under this portfolio model, lawyers accept new cases of all types up to the
point where the expected revenues of each case equal the expected litigation
costs (with costs including a share of costs in losing cases). 39 Competition
from other lawyers and limited judicial oversight of fees are assumed to
prevent the earning of above-normal returns. Cases whose probability of
winning or value if won put their expected value below this point are rejected.
In equilibrium, net returns must be equal across case types, for lawyers have
taken all profitable cases of each type. Higher expected awards in a particular
legal specialty or type of case thus necessarily imply higher costs.
35. See discussion of such reporters below in Appendix i, at notes I and 2.
36. See generally Frank A. Sloan, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Penny B. Githens, Insuing Medical
Malpractice (Oxford U Press, 1991), especially chapter 6 on claims reserving.
37. See generally, for example, Ross, Settled out of Court (cited in note 6); see also Metzloff, 54 L &
Contemp Probs at 116-29 (cited in note 25) (quotation of insurance-file annotations).
38. Many trial lawyers litigate various types of personal injuries. Lawyers may specialize, of
course, to build up expertise in complex types of cases where, for example, an understanding of
engineering or medical practice is advantageous. Even with specialized individuals, however, a law
office may take all types of cases, mixing particular knowledge and talents as appropriate.
Interestingly, even though the two sides' need for expertise and legal talent are so similar, American
trial lawyers, unlike barristers in Great Britain, normally do not "diversify" their litigation portfolios
by taking both plaintiff and defense cases. One supposes that the explanation lies in differences of
attitude and temperament as well as institutional defendants' and insurers' fears of what might be
thereby disclosed that could hurt them in future cases.
39. See, for example, Melvin W. Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Economist's View, 1976 Am Bar
Found ResJ 511, 549.
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D. Behavior. of Juries and Judges
Legal actors are supposed to follow the rules of law dispassionately. So
when disputes reach trial, the appropriate beginning "model" for their
behavior is the basic law of torts and damages that juries and judges apply. 40
Although rules of liability and evidence can vary by type of case, 4 1 rules of
damages are not variable. 42 Thus, in legal theory, a plaintiff with the same
pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses should get the same recovery regardless of
whether she was hurt by a doctor, a driver, or a defective product. Unlike
lawyers, who routinely settle.cases on the basis of expected value (probability
of liability times damages, adjusted for costs), jurors are instructed not to
make such compromises, 43 but rather to make winning plaintiffs "whole,"
with compensation to make their situation as good as if they had never been
injured.4 4 Jurors are of course supposed to be disinterested (they can be
excused from service otherwise) and to decide their case objectively, making
decisions solely on the evidence presented. Although judges can correct jury
errors in damages that were obviously due to prejudice or mistake, 45 jury
discretion and the predominance of general verdicts (without specific findings
of fact) make any errors hard to detect.
How well do real juries and judges follow this model? In contrast to the
logic of self-interested lawyers that has been rather thoroughly modelled, the
performance of putatively disinterested legal actors-juries and judges-has
not.4 6 Although there is some empirical evidence on their performance, most
40. In settlement negotiations, the opposing attorneys may not even refer to what a jury could
be expected to do, rather asserting that their offer or demand is "objectively" correct. Compare
Metzloff, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 92-93 (cited in note 25). Apart from being an obvious
negotiating ploy, another way to interpret this behavior is that lawyers normally expect judges and
juries to do their legal duty and to do it dispassionately.
41. Thus, for example, negligence of an automobile driver is judged by the classic standard of
the "reasonable person," and its application calls for common sense judgment by jurors ("Was
driver X going too fast for the conditions?"). See, for example, Prosser & Keeton at 173-92 (cited in
note 5). The negligence of physicians, in contrast, must be shown as a departure from the customary
practice of similar practitioners. For example, id; Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Practitioners, 12 Vand L Rev 549 (1959). Thus, legal texts have to treat malpractice and products
liability, for example, in separate sections, see, for example, Prosser & Keeton at 115-18, 185-93, 677-
724 (cited in note 5), and specialized legal treatises exist by subject areas, for example, David
Louisell & Harold Williams, Medical Malpractice (Mathew Bender, 1991).
42. Standardized texts thus provide a general treatment, for example, Prosser & Keeton (cited in
note 5); Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies (West, 1973); Charles Tilford McCormick,
Handbook on the Law of Damages (West, 1935), and trial judges' charges to juries are also general. For
one standard judicial charge to a jury, see 8 Am Jur Pleadings & Prac Forms Form 184 (Lawyer's Co-
operative & Bancroft-Whitney, rev ed 1982) ("Am Jur Pleadings").
43. See, for example, 8 Amjur Pleadings Form 137 (cited in note 42) ("In arriving at your verdict
you must not make a compromise between the question of liability and the amount of the damages, if
any."); see also McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages at § 16 (cited in note 42).
44. For example, Restatement (Second) Torts § 901 (Am Law Inst, 1965). Where rules of
"comparative negligence" apply, however, plaintiffs' awards are generally reduced by the percentage
of their relative fault in the injury, under one of the several different versions of the doctrine. For
example, Prosser & Keeton at 468-80 (cited in note 5).
45. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, at §§ 16, 19 (cited in note 42). But judges are
admonished to use these powers sparingly. Id.
46. Cooter & Rubinfeld, 27J Econ Lit at 1094 (cited in note 22).
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discussion occurs on a more qualitative plane.47 The classic case study, based
on observing jury behavior, concluded in part that juries take their social
obligations seriously and try hard to follow the legal rules.48 Similarly, one
empirical analysis of the malpractice system concludes that "court awards are
strongly influenced by the economic loss of the plaintiff and by the law of
compensable damages." 49
Many argue, to the contrary, that jurors are often swayed by emotional and
other legally extraneous factors. Some have gone so far as to label the
process a "lottery.'' 50  The law certainly leaves considerable room for
extraneous factors to influence jury valuation of cases, for the law of damages
is incredibly vague and governed by ad hoc decisions. 5' Jury instructions are
almost wholly qualitative rather than quantitative, and the law lacks a good
mechanism for achieving consistency across cases, even on judicial review. 52
The law of damages has not even created any formal system for reporting of
jury verdicts as it has for substantive law's reported appellate decisions.53
E. Using the Model to Understand Jury Verdict Data
Despite the attention to theoretical modelling of dispute resolution, there
has been relatively little scholarly empirical analysis of jury awards. The lack
of officially reported statistics may be partly responsible; primary data
collection is a daunting exercise. Another possible explanation is a shortage
of legal researchers with an empirical bent and of empirical researchers with a
legal inclination. 54 The leading recent exception to this generalization has
been the work of researchers at RAND. They have analyzed privately
compiled reporters of jury verdicts from two jurisdictions, suggesting, among
other things, that juries' attitudes toward "deep pockets" explain patterns of
47. See, for example, Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, Towards aJurisprudence of
Injury; the Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law 8-15 to 8-32 (Am Bar
Ass'n, 1984) (a report to the American Bar Association).
48. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va L Rev 1055, 1062 (1964); compare Harry
Kalven, Jr., & Hans Zeisel, The American jury (Little, Brown, 1966).
49. Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 222 (cited in note 15). Direct evidence on this point is
provided in Frank A. Sloan & Thomas J. Hoerger, Uncertainty, Information and Resolution of ,11edical
Malpractice Disputes, J Risk & Uncertainty (forthcoming 1991).
50. For example, Jeffrey O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery: Only the Lawyers Win at 8-9 (The Free
Press, 1979).
5 1. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw U L Rev 908, 909-17 (1989).
52. See generally Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem (1965); Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev at 909-19 (cited in note 51).
53. Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev at 960-61 (cited in note 51) (arguing for
official reporting of damage awards and judgments); James F. Blumstein, Randall R. Bovbjerg &
Frank A. Sloan, Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injuries: A Common Law of
Damages and Insurance Contracts for Future Services, 8 YaleJ Reg 171, 177-88 (Winter 1991) (arguing for
development of "common law" of damages).
54. The paucity of systematic evidence about this important American institution may also partly
be due to the desire to maintain a significant mystique. Plausibly, there may be a fear of piercing the
veil, lest the legitimacy of an important "a-responsible" institution be compromised. On the
importance o1 "a-responsible" institutions to make very difficult social decisions, see Guido Calabresi
& Philip Bobbit, Tragic Choices (Norton, 1978).
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awards. 55 A few other researchers have also studied jury outcomes in similar
fashion, emphasizing their importance in settlements as well. 56
Using more jurisdictions for jury information, this article extends this
analytic approach to investigate the deep-pocket and other hypotheses ofjury
behavior. It also adds other data bases to analyze differential jury valuations
in light of lawyers' incentives to select equally "profitable" cases for trial. The
specific hypotheses are examined next.
III
THE DOCTORS VERSUS THE LAWYERS: THEIR HYPOTHESES AND
THEIR EVIDENCE
Controversy swirls about the accuracy and. fairness of jury verdicts.
Physicians typically feel that the system overcompensates litigious patients.
Attorneys often contend that malpractice cases are among the hardest to win
and those cases going to trial necessarily involve larger losses than other types
of cases. This section presents simple, descriptive information about jury
verdicts in five jurisdictions, describes the prototypical competing ex-
planations for the observed patterns, and explains the data used to analyze
the patterns in more depth.
A. Malpractice versus Other Jury Awards
Figure 1 presents data on 1980-85 jury verdicts from five jurisdictions,
which are similar to other available numbers. 57 Medical malpractice awards
are contrasted with three selected types of verdicts: products liability injuries,
suits against governments, and automobile cases. The malpractice, products,
and government cases all represent "deep-pocket" cases; automobile suits are
expected to represent the lowest benchmark of common, "garden variety"
personal injury. Figure 1 shows that simple averages of verdicts are indeed
far higher for medical malpractice than for the three other types; malpractice
verdicts were fully 6.5 times higher than automobile verdicts in 1980.58
Malpractice verdicts were even higher than the other two deep-pocket
categories. Moreover, the gaps seem to be widening. As Figure 1 shows, the
simple malpractice-automobile personal liability ratio rose to 11.1 to 1 in
55. See, for example, notes 8, 63 and accompanying text.
56. See, for example, Daniels & Andrews, The Shadow of the Law (cited in note 6).
57. For such previously published information, see, for example, Jury Verdicts Reports, Injury
Valuation Reports, no. 314, Current Award Trends (Jury Verdict Res, 1989); these data are national
in scope but not representative, see Russell Localio, Variations on $962,258." The Misuse of Data on
Medical Malpractice, L Med & Health Care 126 (June 1985).
58. This ratio is actually lower than the previously reported figures for two of the jurisdictions
represented here. Michael G. Shanley & Mark A. Peterson, Comparative Justice: Civil Jury Verdicts in San
Francisco and Cook Counties, 1959-1980, at 32, 33 (RAND, 1983) (8.6:1 ratio of means in San Francisco,
1975-79); Mark A. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries: CivilJury Verdicts in Cook County 31 (RAND, 1984)
(8.2 ratio of medians).
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FIGURE 1
MEAN JURY VERDICT BY CASE TYPE AND YEAR
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1985.59  Such gross disparities in jury outcomes are used to support
physicians' current quest for even more drastic reforms of the liability
system,60 even though liability insurance rates have recently declined. 6'
B. Physicians' versus Lawyers' Explanations 62
Physicians (and their attorneys) typically see data like those in Figure 1 as
proof of their feeling that the legal system is biased against them, and getting
worse. They think that differentials occur because juries are unusually
generous to patient-plaintiffs, at least in part because of insured doctors' and
hospitals' "deep pockets" for paying awards. 63 Because malpractice plaintiffs
59. Compare Mark A. Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980s: Trends in Jury Trials and Verdicts in
California and 4ook County, Illinois 21 (RAND, 1987) (13.4:1 ratio of means for Chicago in 1980-84,
8.9:1 for California).
60. See Am Med Ass'n, A Proposed Alternative (cited in note 3).
61. See, for example, David Hothaus, Insurance Crisis Is Over-At Least for Now, Hospitals 46
(April 20, 1988).
62. This subsection presents an idealized version of competing hypotheses that is generally
consistent with typical attitudes among these two professions. The authors are responsible for the
precise statement of these positions.
63. See, for example, James Lewis Griffith, What It Will Take to Solve the Malpractice Crisis, Med
Econ 193, 195 (September 27, 1982) ("Too often [jurors] act like Santa Claus, handing out millions
of dollars in cases involving comparatively minor injuries."). Perhaps it should be noted that simple
jury bias against "the rich" is not the only explanation that juries might treat deep-pocket defendants
differently. It could be that institutional defendants are held to a different standard of care as well.
Consider slips and falls, a common cause of action. Juries might well expect apartment buildings and
businesses to shovel snow and clean up slippery spills more promptly than ordinary homeowners, for
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receive extravagant amounts in malpractice cases, their contingent-fee lawyers
also earn too much-far more than needed to assure competent repre-
sentation. Hence, the lawyers are willing to take even more and weaker cases
to trial in the hopes of hitting the "jackpot." As a result, too many
malpractice cases are non-meritorious or even "frivolous," this argument
concludes. 64  The doctors' position could thus be called the
"generosity/demand pull" hypothesis, that is, that unduly high awards attract
more cases.
Plaintiffs' attorneys can counter that there are other, valid reasons that
malpractice awards tend to be higher. Malpractice claims are inherently more
costly to bring and more difficult to win than, say, automobile cases.
Malpractice cases face a higher legal standard for establishing negligence,
which must be shown by expensive expert testimony,65 and involve complex
sets of facts that call for more legal talent and investigatory resources. 66
Higher costs on each case mean that lawyers need a higher gross award to
earn the same net return; moreover, a lower win rate requires higher
recoveries to cover their costs on the losers. Thus, lawyers must screen out
less severe malpractice cases that would be litigable if they were automobile
injuries. The failure to adjust Figure l's awards for other influences on their
value thus explains the differentials. Moreover, medical plaintiffs' task has
become even harder over time, given the increasing complexity of medical
practice and the spread of tort reform, especially reforms aimed at
malpractice. These developments have accordingly forced even greater
selectivity of cases, which tends to explain the widening differential over time.
This position might be termed the "selectivity/cost push" hypothesis.
In sum, the doctors assert that the high damages available to malpractice
claimants engender cases with a low probability of success. The plaintiffs'
lawyers see causation running the other way, that the lower likelihood of
winning and higher costs of malpractice litigation leads to selection of higher-
damage cases.
C. Descriptive Data versus Controlled Analysis
Figure 1 and similar displays cannot choose between these hypotheses.
Both the doctors' charges and the lawyers' riposte seem logical on their face.
Moreover, both the demand-pull and cost-push hypotheses can explain the
simple picture of unadjusted differentials across types of cases, and are
consistent with the apparent trend over time. But which is right, if either,
about jury behavior? Does overgenerosity promote less meritorious cases?
example. Any such attitude should directly affect determinations of liability, however, not sizes of
awards.
64. For example, Am Med Ass'n, A Proposed Alternative at 5 (cited in note 3) (remarks of Dr.
Flaherty).
65. See generally Prosser & Keeton (cited in note 5); Edward Brunet, The Use and Misuse of Expert
Testimony in Summary Judgment, 22 UC Davis L Rev 93 (1988).
66. Compare Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury at
11-25 to 11-38 (cited in note 47).
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Or do difficulties proving malpractice force selective cutbacks on cases taken
to trial?
The true picture can emerge only from controlled statistical analyses, to
which the remainder of this article is devoted. To date, evidence on jury
verdicts has largely been descriptive. RAND has stood virtually alone in
conducting multivariate analysis on jury verdicts, contrasting different types
of cases. 67 This article provides advances on the RAND methods. Parts IV, V,
and VI present our three sets of analyses.
The data used in this article, not only in Figure 1 but also in the more
important analyses that follow, come from private jury verdict reporters in five
jurisdictions: Chicago; San Francisco and other parts of California; the state
of Florida; Kansas City, Kansas; and Kansas City, Missouri. For the first two
jurisdictions, we benefitted from previously collected RAND data. Infor-
mation from the latter three were compiled in the same format specifically for
this article. These five areas are geographically disparate and otherwise
representative of different types of areas across the country.68
IV
FIRST ANALYSIS: THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERENTIAL JURY AWARDS
This section begins this article's more detailed analysis of patterns and
trends injury verdicts, contrasting medical malpractice with comparison types
of cases. It first revisits the seemingly straightforward question of whether
malpractice verdicts are higher than others. Going beyond Part III, this
section makes comparisons controlling for the severity of injury and other relevant
factors. 69
A. How TYPE OF CASE AND OTHER VARIABLES INFLUENCE VERDICT SIZE
Regression analysis was used to examine what factors influence juries'
decisions on liability and size of awards (the "dependent variables" in the
regressions). Our major interest was the influence of case type, specifically,
the four types already noted-malpractice, products liability, government,
and automobile. 70 The analysis controlled for severity of injury, jurisdiction,
and other relevant factors, including economic loss, age, and extent of
67. See sources cited in note 8 above. For additional empirical analysis on the actual per-
formance of juries, but lacking the same comparative focus, see also, for example, Daniels &
Andrews, The Shadow of the Law at 161 (cited in note 6).
68. Appendix I explains the data in greater detail.
69. This and subsequent investigation relies on multiple regression analysis. These statistical
techniques examine the influence on an outcome of various measured factors, each considered as
though the others were held constant. For an introduction to the use of multiple regression, see
Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Peter 0. Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 L & Contemp
Probs 69, 88-104 (Autumn 1983).
70. We discuss only the "pure" case types in text. See Appendix 2 on "hybrid" cases.
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comparative negligence found by juries-all of which are "independent
variables." A time-trend variable was also included. 7 1
Table 1 presents the results from regression analyses for two dependent
variables: The first, presented in column 1, is the probability that the plaintiff
wins an award. The second, in column 2, is the size of the award, if there was
one, expressed mathematically as the natural logarithm of the actual dollar
amount. The coefficients presented show the relative influence of each
variable on probability and size of awards. 72 (Standard errors are given in
parentheses, and levels of statistical significance are indicated.)
This section considers column 2's results on the size of awards. 73 The
influence of case type is shown by the regression coefficients for "auto,"
"product liability," and "government." Malpractice awards were the omitted
category, the reference against which the other types are compared. The
negative signs of the coefficients for the other case types show that their
awards were all lower than for malpractice cases. From the values of the
coefficients, we calculate that malpractice awards were about three times
higher than awards in automobile cases, slightly more than products liability,
and almost twice that of government cases. Only the automobile award
coefficient was statistically different from medical malpractice (at the 1 percent
level, which means that this result could be expected as a result of chance only
1 percent of the time).
In general, severity of injury also had a statistically significant impact, as
one would expect. More severe injuries received higher awards; the relevant
coefficients show a consistent pattern vis-a-vis award size. The least serious
injuries (numbers 1 and 2 on the six-point scale) received lower awards than
death cases (the omitted category). In contrast, the most severe injuries
(numbers 4 and 5) received higher awards than death cases. The most
severely injured living plaintiffs received awards that were about nine and a
half times larger than awards received by the least severely injured plaintiffs.
The separately calculated severity index also had a highly significant positive
effect on awards. On the other hand, whether injury aggravated a preexisting
condition or whether there was loss of consortium had no significant effects
on awards.
Other variables generally had the expected impact. For example, reported
medical expenses and wage loss had highly significant, positive coefficients: a
10 percent increase in medical expense, for example, led to about a 3 percent
increase in awards (regardless of type); and a 10 percent nise in wage loss
raised awards slightly less than 1 percent.
7 1. A full list of the variables used and a more detailed explanation of our approach appear in
Appendix 2.
72. The relative sizes of awards cannot be read directly from the coefficients presented in Table
1. Instead, the "marginal effects" of each must be mathematically calculated according to a formula
given in Appendix 2.
73. We also ran separate regressions that omitted the time trend. In these regressions, not
reported here, the malpractice-automobile and malpractice-government differences were both highly
significant (1% level), but malpractice and product liability awards were not significantly different.
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TABLE 1
REGRESSION RESULTS: PROBABILITIES OF WINNING AND AWARDS
(ALL INJURIES)
Explanatory Variables Probability of Winning* Log Award**
Intercept -0.044 (0.16) 5.59' (0.55)
Auto 0.78' (0.16) -0.94' (0.26)
Product liability 0.44 (0.28) -0.05 (0.43)
Government 0 .6 0 b (0.24) -0.27 (0.37)
Time 0.006 (0.013) 0.014 (0.022)
Time * auto 0.007 (0.015) -0.012 (0.024)
Time * product liability -0.009 (0.026) -0.011 (0.039)
Time * government -0.015 (0.023) -0.034 (0.034)
Hybrid government cases 0.17 (0.25) - 1 .69' (0.40)
Hybrid cases with medical malpractice -0.92' (0.27) 0.36 (0.41)
Hybrid cases without med. malpractice 0.29 (0.17) -0.34 (0.31)
Time * hybrid government 0.033 (0.024) 0.10, (0.037)
Time * hybrid with medical malpractice -0. 0 6 1b (0.026) -0.062 (0.039)
Time * hybrid without med. malpractice 0.014 (0.018) 0.007 (0.029)
Injury 1 0.059 (0.057) - 1.07' (0.22)
Injury 2 0.18' (0.053) -0.37' (0.19)
Injury 3 0.19' (0.056) 0.20 (0.18)
Injury 4 0.28' (0.074) 0.94' (0.17)
Injury 5 0.25 b  (0.10) 1.45' (0.18)
Injury missing -0.86' (0.13) -0.86' (0.32)
Injury index 0.35' (0.041)
Injury aggravated pre-exist condition 0. 16 (0.045) -0.09 (0.06)
Original number of plaintiffs -0.002 (0.015) -0.1 0 (0.024)
Original number of defendants 0.064 (0.013) 0.034c (0.018)
Medical expense 0.34' (0.018)
Medical expense missing 3.16' (0.17)
Wage loss 0.097' (0.015)
Wage loss missing 0.81' (0.15)
Newborn 0 .6 5 b (0.25)
Age 1-10 -0.023 (0.16)
Age 11-17 0.087 (0.14)
Age 18-35 0.086 (0.094)
Age 36-50 0.083 (0.098)
Age 51-64 0 .2 0 b (0.10)
Age missing -- 0.20' (0.11)
Female -0.10 h  (0.04)
Sex missing -0.14 (0.14)
Nonwhite 0.19, (0.11)
Race missing 0.17' (0.061)
Separated -0.27' (0.10)
Married status missing -0. 1 2 b (0.061)
Not working -0.19, (0.069)
Employment missing -0.057 (0.077)
Non-professional job -0.12 (0.076)
Job missing -0.24' (0.089)
Comparative negligence 0.57' (0.078)
% of negligence -0.027- (0.002)
% of negligence missing - 1.32' (0.42)
Settle 0.26' (0.08)
Loss consortium 0.09 (0.11)
Federal court 0.14 (0.092) 0.48' (0.14)
Kansas City, Missouri -0.94' (0.084) -0.54' (0.15)
Kansas City, Kansas -0.95d (0.095) -0.49' (0.18)
California -0.75' (0.056) -0. 2 2 b (0.09)
Illinois -0.80' (0.063) -0.51' (0.12)
Log likelihood -5426.2
P2 0.62
Sample Size 8,388 4,588
Source: Florida-Kansas City jury verdict and RAND jury verdict data (1973-87); see Appendices I & 2.
Notes: * Estimated by Probit Analysis (T-statistics in parentheses after coefficients)
"
5 Estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (T-statistics in parentheses after coefficients)
a. Significant at 0.01 critical level
b. Significant at 0.05 critical level
c. Significant at 0.10 critical level
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One surprise, however, is that awards are not found to rise over time (with
other explanatory variables included). Methodologically, this conclusion
follows from the lack of statistical significance for the "time-interaction
terms" in Table 1. The time trend in our regressions was interacted with each
case type (shown as "time*case type"; the variable "time" alone represents its
interaction with malpractice).
B. Explaining our Observations
Awards rose during 1973-87 and 1980-85 (Figure 1). Various factors that
affect awards also changed systematically over time. Controlling for these
other factors, the difference in jury awards between medical malpractice and
automobile cases is far less than was shown in Figure 1. Controlling for
severity, wage loss, medical bills, and other legitimate influences reduced the
apparent malpractice-automobile differential to "only" three to one. This
analysis does not explain who is right about why some case types get higher
awards than others; it merely documents that they do.
Moreover, we find no support for the doctors' hypothesis that the gap in
favor of malpractice plaintiffs grew during this period (which is longer than
the period reflected in Figure 1). Controlling for other determinants of
awards, the case-type differential did not worsen over time, contrary to
doctors' fears and the unadjusted data in Figure 1. So either juries in these
jurisdictions are not becoming significantly more generous or tort reforms
have tended to counteract the juries' innate generosity. The latter
explanation is not appealing, as reforms have varied by state as well as by type
of case during this period (most have been for malpractice only), yet no
statistically significant time trends were found anywhere.
It is surprising that, even controlling for other factors, differences per-
sisted over time in levels of recovery by case type. The puzzle: Suppose that
juries are truly over-generous to malpractice plaintiffs, regardless of severity
of injury and other factors. Then, legal effort spent on malpractice cases
earns much more relative to effort spent on other types of cases (see Part II).
Why, then, did lawyers not learn this and bring still more malpractice cases, as
common sense and Part II's model would suggest? Available information
indicates that many cases are not litigated, much less pursued to trial.7 4 How
can malpractice cases consistently pay more if plaintiffs' lawyers are equalizing
returns across case types? We turn next to the perplexing issue of lawyers'
expected returns on different types of cases.
74. See Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge and Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal
System, both in Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical
Malpractice Appendix, 658 and 87, 97-100, respectively (cited, respectively, in notes 19, 20).
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V
SECOND ANALYSIS: EXPECTED VALUES BY TYPE OF CASE
Regardless of the average size of awards, a prospective jury case only has
positive value if it is expected to win. The expected value is the product of the
likelihood of winning an award and the size of that award, net of costs
incurred to win. (See also Part II above.) Part IV calculated the likely awards
by case type. This section documents the probabilities of winning and
calculates the resulting expected values. The key to the puzzling persistence
of differential recoveries is understanding what value attaches to different
types of case.
A. The Probability of Winning: Lower for Malpractice
The probability of winning a jury award varied considerably by case type
(Table 1, column 1). Malpractice scored the lowest of all, as can be seen from
the positive coefficients for all the other types of cases in column 1. (Recall
that malpractice is the "omitted" case type in Table 1, so that it does not
appear directly, but the other values are all relative to malpractice.) These
differences were observed among case types even controlling for plaintiff
characteristics, severity of injury, and other factors that also affect likelihood
of winning. (Again, Appendix 2 discusses the regression variables used.) The
probability of winning a personal injury trial was highest for automobile cases,
followed by government cases, product liability cases, and malpractice cases,
in that order.
From the findings reported in Table 1, we calculated that the predicted
probability of winning in malpractice trials was 0.33. 75 Automobile, govern-
ment, and products liability cases had probabilities of winning of 0.64, 0.48,
and 0.44, respectively. 76 The automobile and government categories had
significant coefficients, so there is statistical confidence that these categories
are indeed more likely to win than is medical malpractice.
Other variables also affected the likelihood of winning. Being in the least
severe injury category (number 1) had no significant effect, but, otherwise, the
win probability rose fairly consistently with severity of injury, other factors
held constant, including case type. In addition, an injury that aggravated a
preexisting condition had a significantly higher probability of winning. 77 All
the jurisdictions shown in Table 1-the two Kansas Cities, California, and
Chicago-had lower win probabilities than Florida. The coefficients are
75. This prediction is not the simple average of wins observed, but rather controls for variation
in the other variables. Specifically, predicted values were calculated at the sample means of other
variables. See also Appendix 2.
76. As for the awards regression, the coefficients presented in Table 1, column 1, do not directly
yield win probabilities but rather must be mathematically transformed. See Appendix 2.
77. As for the awards regression, we also included time trend terms for each case type. We
found some slight evidence of a rising trend in malpractice win probabilities (as captured by the time
variable) and in automobile probabilities, accompanied by a falling trend in product liability and
government cases. However, all of the time trend variables are of negligible magnitude, and are
statistically insignificant.
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negative and statistically significant. (Florida was the omitted category, so
does not directly appear in the table.) However, there were no appreciable
differences in win probabilities across the other four jurisdictions, and the
observed difference may simply reflect differences in data gathering in that
state. 78 We found no statistically significant effect of federal versus state court
trials on the probability of plaintiffs winning.
What is one to make of these differences? Our prior expectation was for
the 50-50 win ratios predicted by theory (see Part II) and previously reported
for Chicago and California. 79 The reasons that the win ratio is not 50-50 as
predicted by the theory of settlement may lie in the theory's assumptions. For
example, it is quite plausible that the two sides are not both risk neutral, as
the standard model presumes. Conventional wisdom is that individual
plaintiffs are risk averse,80 but a defendant may also be risk averse.8 '
Moreover, the two sides' stakes in the outcome may not be symmetrical;
defendants but not plaintiffs may well fear "spillover" effects on their
reputations of a well-publicized verdict, rather than a quiet settlement.
Defendants not infrequently impose as a condition of settlement that plaintiffs
not discuss the settlement; they may also petition courts to seal the records of
a case.
Similarly, liability insurers, which strongly influence the conduct of
investigation and defense, are also apt to fear large verdicts more than large,
private settlements. As formal findings, especially if upheld on appeal,
verdicts may have larger spillover effects on the value of other pending and
future cases. The same logic suggests that manufacturers especially fear the
loss of a precedent-setting case against a particular product, for that may
prompt other plaintiffs to bring "copycat" product lawsuits in a way not
possible for plaintiffs in other types of cases. These spillover effects would
78. This result could be due to underreporting of Florida cases; the two Florida reporters
attempt to cover verdicts statewide, whereas the others are limited to individual metropolitan areas.
See Appendix 1.
79. RAND had previously reported descriptive (uncontrolled) data showing roughly a 51-49
split between plaintiff and defense victories, unchanged over 1960-79, for all case types in Chicago.
Malpractice and products liability, however, showed not only a lower win percentage (33 and 38,
respectively), but also an upward trend over time, on an uncontrolled basis. Mark A. Peterson &
George L. Priest, The CivilJury. Trends in Trials and Verdicts, Cook County, Illinois, 1960-1979, 11-19
(RAND, 1982) (R-2881-ICJ). For San Francisco, the overall win percentage was higher, less stable,
but generally rising, with malpractice and products liability again below average but rising over time.
Shanley & Peterson, Comparative Justice at 23-26 (cited in note 58). The win rate apparently rose again
in 1980-84 for malpractice and products liability in both cities, again in an uncontrolled analysis.
Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980s at 43 (cited in note 59). Our data on Chicago and California came
from RAND. See Appendix 1. Our controlled analysis reported in text, in contrast, found no
increase in winning percentage over 1973-87 in five jurisdictions.
80. In Viscusi's analysis of risk aversion in the context of product liability, the defendant firm is
assumed to be risk neutral and the plaintiff risk averse. Viscusi, 17 J Legal Stud 101 (cited in note
27).
8 1. See generally Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical
Approach, 71 Rev Econ & Stat 189 (1989) and references contained therein. Fournier and Zuehlke's
results suggest that defendants rather than plaintiffs are risk averse. Nor is it implausible that
defense attorneys tend to be risk averse and plaintiffs risk seeking (consider the personalities that
want hourly payment rather than a percentage of winnings), which could influence their professional
valuations of a case on behalf of clients.
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also make defendants, particularly in malpractice and products liability cases,
willing to spend more on defense, necessitating greater countervailing efforts
from the plaintiffs' side, with corresponding higher legal costs. 82 To the
extent liability insurers are influential, it may be noted that they figure in all
types of litigation. Their influence may be greater in malpractice and
products liability cases because physician-sponsored insurers dominate the
malpractice insurance market. Moreover, many hospitals and manufacturers
are self-insured, as are many governments, thus combining the defendant and
insurer perspectives.
Plaintiffs might also have motives going beyond simple monetary recovery
if they seek vengeance or thorough investigation of perceived wrongdoing.8
Thus, for example, a patient or her family might be determined to "get even"
with a doctor they dislike or "get to the bottom" of unknown events during an
operation, despite legal-medical advice that they are unlikely to win.
Although one would expect plaintiffs' lawyers to resist incurring the legal
costs of low-probability cases, there may be reputational benefits to them
beyond immediate returns if they win a large-dollar, "long-shot" case. As
already noted, the two sides may also have asymmetric information (plaintiffs
knowing more about their own injuries, defendants more about their own
allegedly substandard behavior). Finally, where the law as applied to the facts
of an individual case is uncertain, parties are more likely to differ in their
valuations and hence seek a trial. Differences from the model's assumptions
could thus help explain the variance from the model's expected 50-50 results.
In any case, we find no evidence that whatever behavior has caused the lower
winning percentage has intensified over time.
B. The Expected Value of Verdicts: Higher for Malpractice
Both the probability of winning and the likely amount of winnings affect
decisions to proceed to trial. Specifically, they combine to yield the expected
value of a case. How do these values vary by type of case, if at all? This
subsection adopts the perspective of the lawyer (or law office) seeking to
maximize returns on a multi-case portfolio of "investments" in contingent fee
lawsuits. According to "portfolio" theory, net expected returns to plaintiffs'
attorneys should be equal across case types (Part II above).
What do the data show? We cannot directly observe lawyers' net returns
because data on plaintiffs' lawyers' earnings and expenses were not available.
We can, however, estimate gross expected awards. To do so, we combined
results on the probability of winning (Table 1, column 1, above) with results
on awards if won (Table 1, column 2, above). Table 2 shows expected awards,
based on predicted win probabilities and predicted awards (conditional on a
finding of liability). 84 The values for automobile, product liability, and
82. See Rowe, 47 L & Contemp Probs at 159 (cited in note 23).
83. See, for example, Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice
Payments: Is the Compensation System Fair?, 24 L & Soc'y Rev 997 (1990).
84. These results were calculated at the total sample means.
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government cases are given in relative terms, with malpractice scaled to 1.00.
The second column, "C," in each pair is more important.8 5
TABLE 2
EXPECTED AWARDS AT VERDICT
Relative
Probability Relative
Relative of Size of
Size of Plaintiffs Expected
Award Winning Award
Casetypes NC C NC C NC C
Auto liability 0.08 0.34 1.74 1.94 0.14 0.66
Product liability 0.57 0.86 1.26 1.33 0.72 1.14
Government 0.17 0.54 1.28 1.45 0.22 0.78
Medical malpractice 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Predicted probability of plaintiff winning in medical
malpractice cases 0.35 0.33
Key:
NC: Not full controlled-based on regression that includes only case type, jurisdiction, and
time trend, but not other characteristics of case. Results in table calculated at mean of
time trend.
C: Controlled-based on regression that includes characteristics above, severity of injury,
and other characteristics of case. Results in table calculated at mean of time trend.
The differentials in expected awards are not large on average (see the far
right column of Table 2). Product liability expected awards are 14 percent
higher than for malpractice, but this difference is based on regression results
that were not statistically significant. Government cases are intermediate
between malpractice and automobile cases. Hence, broadly speaking, the
expected values across these case types seem consistent with the lawyer-
portfolio theory, with one exception: The expected awards for automobile
cases are only two thirds those for malpractice cases (0.66 as compared to
1.00); or, conversely, malpractice scores half again higher. This differential is
substantially less than the threefold difference seen in awards (Part IV), but it
remains puzzling. 86 Can it be true that lawyers could consistently earn more
85. There are two columns of figures for each category in Table 2, labelled NC and C. Column
NC presents relatively non-controlled values, controlled only for jurisdiction and time trend (from a
regression not presented in this article), whereas column C reflects fully controlled regression results
from Table 1. We refer mainly to column C in text.
86. It should be recognized that plaintiffs (and hence their lawyers) do not always collect the
entire reported amount of jury verdicts, and there is reason to think that post-trial changes reduce
the differential in net returns discussed in text. Post-trial reductions are not infrequent, with
additions less common. See Michael G. Shanley & Mark A. Peterson, Posttrial Adjustments to jury
Awards (RAND, 1987) (R-3511-ICJ). Changes may be achieved by the trial judge through additur,
remittitur, or other means (the jury verdict reporters often report on such adjustments, and the data
analyzed include these changes when reported). After trial, further changes remain possible, either
by settlement of the parties pending an appeal or by order of an appellate court.
Shanlev & Peterson report survey data on the extent of reduction by size ofjury award and type of
case in Chicago and California. Changes are said to occur in 20% of all verdicts (30% of plaintiff
wins and 5% of defense wins), with 15% of the 20% being increases and 5% decreases. Id at 26-27.
Changes are extensive when they occur, causing an average reduction in all personal injury cases of
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by shifting effort from automobile cases to malpractice ones? If so, then why
do they not do so?
C. Explaining Persistent Differences in Expected Values
According to theory, only two phenomena could explain the long-term
maintenance of such a differential: The first is barriers to entry that prevent
new lawyers (automobile specialists and others) from litigating ever-higher-
value cases until expected returns equalize. The second is higher litigation
costs; net expected returns might equalize even though the gross values do not.
There appear to be few barriers to lawyers selecting cases as they see fit.
Among attorneys, there is informal, de facto specialization, 7 and higher
knowledge or talent seems to command a wage premium in law, as in other
labor markets.8 8 However, there is no formal or de jure system of certified
specialization (quite unlike medicine) that might prevent a lawyer from
changing the mix of legal practice to include more malpractice cases than
automobile cases, for example. Legally, any lawyer is entitled to litigate any
case. Flexibility in choosing portfolios of cases is even greater if one
considers the deciding entity to be the law firm rather than its individual
lawyers. Given informal specialization, in the short run it may be hard to
begin to litigate specialized cases like malpractice or products liability. But in
the long run, talented lawyers from other specialties can enter any field, given
sufficient motivation to do so. Thus, although we lack hard data on the extent
of entry and exit of lawyers from various types of personal injury practice, we
find this explanation very implausible.
The second explanation is a differential in costs of litigating medical
malpractice (and products liability) cases versus others. This hypothesis is far
more plausible on its face. Complex, high-stakes litigation like malpractice
involves technical issues regarding both the standard of care and causation;
thus malpractice trials require considerable non-legal expertise. Hence they
almost certainly require more hours of legal time to investigate and resolve,
and therefore probably cost more per case than "garden variety" automobile
cases where liability often turns on simple fact finding and common sense,
and causation is obvious.8 9 Moreover, available statistics bolster the higher-
cost hypothesis: Insurance company data show that malpractice cases cost
fully 20% (id at ix, 34-36), 33% for medical malpractice (id at x, 42-44). Unfortunately, these survey
results cannot be directly used to adjust our jury verdict data, even for California and Chicago,
because their reported "post-trial" reductions include remittitur accounts for some (presumably
large) share of them. Id at 6. The study is unclear on how its survey findings relate to jury verdict
data from reporters, which often report verdicts after remittitur or additur.
87. See, for example, Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System at 92-95 (cited in
note 20) (on lawyers known to be malpractice specialists).
88. High-stakes cases probably attract higher-priced legal talent and greater effort on both sides,
thus raising costs, but presumably canceling each other out in terms of outcomes.
89. Lawyers and investigators of high-stakes cases also plausibly earn higher fees per hour, see
note 90. Moreover, to the extent that malpractice and products liability defendants or their insurers
spend more on one case because of spillover effects on other cases, plaintiffs must follow suit, see
text accompanying notes 29, 62-66.
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about twice as much to defend as automobile injury cases, for example (Figure
2). More precisely, loss adjustment expense ("LAE") averages almost one
quarter of total losses for malpractice, only 12 to 15 percent for automobile
passenger liability.90 Figure 2 shows little change over time.9'
There are no corresponding data on plaintiffs' costs for litigation, as
lawyers are not a regulated industry and law firms are not publicly owned
corporations. However, the insurer-defendants' expense ratio is a reasonable
proxy for plaintiffs' overall litigation costs by case type as well. Any given
legal action on one side typically engenders a response from the other side,
perhaps most obviously where one side's filing requires a reaction or where
both sides appear for a deposition sought by one of them.92 Indeed,
plaintiffs' litigation expenses may well be systematically higher.93 Plaintiffs'
legal costs also may be growing faster over time, for many tort reforms
intentionally sought to raise plaintiffs' costs relative to defendants' costs. It
has also been estimated that total legal hours (plaintiff and defense) spent on
all litigated cases (not just those litigated to verdict) is lower for automobile
cases than for all other torts. 94 In all, there is good reason to conclude that
malpractice costs are persistently higher than automobile litigation costs.9 5
This cost differential not only helps reconcile the apparent imbalance in
expected values but also helps explain why lawyers may disproportionately
90. LAE consists of those costs known to be attributable to investigation, litigation, and
settlement of claims, notably payments to independent lawyers and claims investigators hired by the
insurer. LAE does not include insurers' more general operating expenses. The reported ratio is
LAE divided by the sum of claims losses plus LAE. Note, however, that available data apply to all
claims settlement alike, with no differentiation for cases going to verdict. Although cases going to
verdict obviously cost more, the differential between more and less costly litigation seems unlikely to
diminish at trial. If anything, it might increase, as higher priced experts often earn even more for trial
appearances than for pre-trial work.
. 91. The 1980-85 malpractice LAE data assume a "W-shaped" curve (Figure 2). Over 1978-88,
the "W" is even more pronounced (1978 being the first year with data on physician mutual insurers,
which dominate malpractice coverage; 1988 the latest year available). There was continuous decline
from 1978-82, the mid-point "spike" in 1983 (Figure 2), and a continuing rise from 1984 through
1988, to fully 30.23%. The automobile liability LAE percentage is less variable, both in Figure 2 and
over the longer period of 1978-88 (starting at 14.90% and ending at 13.79%).
92. Compare Kakalik & Pace, Costs and Compensation at 98-116 (cited in note 1) (analyzing
University of Wisconsin data for automobile versus all other cases; note that patterns of lawyer effort
are similar between plaintiff and defendant; also, hours per case are lower for automobile cases).
93. Theory and evidence both support this supposition. The defense bar clearly does specialize,
and defense attorneys have long-term relations with insurer-defendants, which presumably create
continuing expertise and give some economies of scale operation. The best empirical estimate is that
plaintiffs' legal fees and expenses claim 24% of total monetary cost for all tort litigation, versus 18%
for the defense. Id at xi. Moreover, the hours spent by plaintiffs' attorneys on non-automobile torts
are higher than for automobile. Id at 100-01.
94. Id.
95. A note of caution: We do not know with certainty to what extent these higher costs are
embedded in lawyers' time versus other expenses (from filing fees to expert witnesses), although we
expect that most of the differential is in legal time, as experts' roles, however large, are far smaller
than those of the attorneys who solicit and use their testimony. Kakalik and Pace present relevant
data from the University of Wisconsin Civil Litigation Project. Kakalik & Pace, Costs and Compensation
at Ill (cited in note 1). For litigation terminated in 1978 in 12 jurisdictions, expenses were only 7-
10% of legal fees plus expenses, varying by type of case and federal versus state courts. However,
only 287 cases reported such data, well under half the 654 cases in their sample. Id.
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select larger malpractice cases-lawyers cannot as readily afford to bear
higher costs in smaller injury cases. 96
FIGURE 2
MALPRACTICE VERSUS AUTO COSTS OF LITIGATION
Loss Adjustment Expenses (1980-85) as a Percentage of Total Losses
LAE as % of Tot. Losses
30.0
25.0
20.0 .
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0- ''
80 81 82 83 84 85
Malpractice 26.6 23.5 23.1 26.4 22.6 24.7
AuLto Psngr. Liab. LII 15.0 14.4 14.1 14.0 12.9 13.2
Years
Source: Calculated from A. M. Best Company aggregate and averages, various years.
Just how much of the differential in expected value between malpractice
and automobile cases might be explained by differences in cost? For purposes
of illustration, consider that the average expected value of a malpractice case
was about $300,000 (in 1987 dollars), so that the expected value of an
equivalent automobile case would be $198,000 (0.66 as much), a difference of
$102,000. Some $51,000, half of the difference in expected value, is
explained by the cost differential of Figure 2. 9 7
Thus, the large difference between malpractice and automobile awards is
accounted for, in part, by malpractice's lower overall win rate and its higher
96. They could do so if contingency fees were higher for more complex cases, but it appears that
a standard flat or sliding scale is applied across the board and not negotiated or adjusted case-by-
case. Another adjustment for higher non-attorney costs would be for plaintiffs to pay separately for
expenses outside the contingent fee percentage; this does appear to happen, but apparently to a
small extent. See note 95.
97. The calculation: For malpractice, the 25% LAE-to-total-loss ratio implies a cost-to-award
percentage of 33% (0.25 = 0.33/1.33). For automobile, the 14% ratio implies a percentage of 16%
(0.14 = 0.16/1.16). The difference is 17% of the expected award; 17% of $300,000 is $51,000.
This simplistic calculation assumes that LAE is a constant percentage across all stages of dispute
resolution; more plausibly, expenditure rises as cases progress from initial claim through the legal
process to trial. It also assumes that the LAE percentage is constant for all sizes of award; more
plausibly, some costs are fixed, but others are variable in a non-linear relationship.
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costs. Thus, much of the differential in awards for the types of cases we
examined can be explained from the plaintiffs' lawyers' perspective-either
there are no excess returns to lawyers representing plaintiffs or the returns
are not major. Thus, the puzzle about lawyers' behavior is to a large extent
solved.
There remains a more important puzzle about juries' behavior, however,
and hence about the accuracy and fairness of today's system ofjury trials. Our
analyses have not yet explained how juries are persuaded to pay more for a
medical malpractice case than for a very similar case of automobile injury.
After all, although juries plausibly understand that part of their award will go
to compensate the plaintiff's attorney, no jury in any individual case knows
anything about any of the patterns discussed here, most certainly not that
malpractice costs are higher than others and the malpractice win rate lower.
VI
THIRD SET OF ANALYSES: THE LAWYERS' SELECTION HYPOTHESIS
VERSUS THE DOCTORS' THEORY OF OVER-GENEROUS
JURIES, CONTINUED
The foregoing two analyses controlled as well as possible for observable
characteristics that legitimately affect jury verdicts across types of cases. Yet,
despite adjustment for other influences, award differentials persist, with
malpractice at the high end. It follows that some unobserved factor(s) must
influence verdict size. This section considers the likely explanations. The two
competing hypotheses are those first presented in Part IIl-the physicians'
claim that juries are uniformly over-generous in malpractice cases and the
plaintiffs' attorneys' response that malpractice trials feature only highly
selective cases. This section considers the lawyers' view first.
A. The Lawyers' Selection Hypothesis
From the perspective of the plaintiffs' lawyers, one may contend that juries
pay more for some types of cases because lawyers select cases with legit-
imately higher severity. Such differentials are by hypothesis ones that our
objective severity measures do not capture (or the regression analyses would
have controlled for them), so this also might be termed the "unobserved
severity" hypothesis. After all, pain and suffering, disfigurement, humiliation,
and other recognized non-pecuniary damages can legitimately vary according
to idiosyncratic circumstances of an injury not described by its objective
outcome on a six-point injury scale or an injury index.
On the other hand, some seemingly unobserved severity is not entirely
missed by our variables: In particular, hard-to-quantify physical harm is partly
captured by the variable for medical costs, as are those psychological harms
treated with mental health services, and disfigurement treated by cosmetic
surgery. Nonetheless, one can imagine that suffering, for example, could vary
by case type, even where the objective severity category (like "major
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temporary injury") is the same. 98 Thus, plaintiffs suing for delayed diagnosis
of a painful disease might have more protracted non-pecuniary damages than
for slow recovery from auto-accident trauma. We tested for "unobserved
severity" in two ways, as discussed in the following subsections. 99
1. Jury Verdicts in Cases Involving Death. First, we hypothesized that any
unobserved differences in severity of injury would be least in the most severe,
least ambiguous category-death. 10 0 Controlling for factors like age, known
pecuniary losses, and presence of consortium claim, deaths should be quite
alike in unobserved severity, certainly more so than other severity categories.
It is true that there are some differences-notably in the influence on non-
pecuniary loss of the circumstances of death (for example, quick and painless
versus lingering suffering).' 1 But differences in short-term circumstances
should have least weight in the longest-term injuries. Therefore we analyzed
death cases as a special example to test the hypothesis of unobserved severity.
We performed a pair of "death" regressions analogous to the all-injury
regressions described above (Table 1).102 Contrary to the hypothesis,
however, we found the same pattern of differential recovery by case type in
death cases as in all-injury ones. If anything, the differentials were more
extreme (although statistical confidence was lower because of the far smaller
number of observations in this subset of the data). Because of this overall
similarity, and to conserve space, death regressions are not presented.
2. Comparative Regressions across Case Types. Second, we ran regressions
similar to the foregoing ones for each case type separately to examine the
"structure" ofjuries' implicit "damages function." That is, we sought to tease
98. It may be objected that all injuries are idiosyncratic, and there really are no equivalents
across cases, much less across case types. This argument proves too much. If taken literally, no
disability program could function, and no epidemiological research would be possible. We know
from research experience that the standard scale of injury severity can readily be applied in most
cases, though there are boundary issues and some differences in "true" severity within a coded
category. Perhaps the "loosest" category is "emotional only" injury, included in "severity I" in this
article. It encompasses very minor, temporary discomfort or upset as well as long-term, severe
mental illness or distress. But, as noted above, other variables, like medical expense, partly account
for such differences. For another, more detailed attempt to scale severe injuries, see Frank A. Sloan
& Stephen S. van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in Medical Malpractice, 54 L & Contemp Probs
131 (Winter 1991).
99. We also sought to test for a factor of "jury antipathy" by regressing payment on an index of
culpability for automobile cases, plus the usual assortment of control variables. The index took
account of such allegations as drunk driving and hit and run. However, results were inconclusive-
the index's coefficient was not statistically significant when added to the automobile injury
regression, and its addition did not change the R 2-and are not presented here.
100. Of course, different jurisdictions have very different rules on allowable damages in death
cases, especially with regard to recoveries of non-pecuniary damages by survivors. See generally,
Stuart M. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death (Lawyer's Co-operative, 3d ed 1979); Prosser & Keeton at
949-54 (cited in note 5); Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies at 557-62 (cited in note 42), but our
analysis controls for jurisdiction.
101. The difference is legally consequential because conscious pain and suffering of a decedent is
compensable.
102. The list of variables in the death regressions was identical to that in the all-injury regression
(Appendix 2), except that severity of injury indicators were deleted, because death was the major
symptom for these cases in that indicator.
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out what the relative importance was of various factors in contributing to the
awards made and to compare these contributions by type of case.
Suppose the hypothesis is correct, and there was some unobserved
severity in our data that systematically differed across case types (for example,
larger actual pain and suffering for malpractice). This unknown factor would
have changed the explanatory power of our known variables, reducing the
overall amount of variation in results explainable by our measured factors. 0 3
Hence, we expected to see differences across the case-type regressions in the
separate coefficients of different explanatory variables, especially for severity
of injury, as well as reduced explanatory power for all variables combined (a
lower "R 2" statistic for the entire regression). 0 4
We did not. To the contrary, what the results show is that the regressions
are startlingly similar in coefficients and R2 (Table 3).105 The difference in the
dollar value attached to malpractice and automobile injuries is almost wholly
captured in the highly significant intercept terms of the regressions (with
malpractice much higher than automobile).' 0 6
We conclude that juries probably value injuries in much the same way
regardless of what type of case it is, except that, once liability is established,
they more than double the amount for malpractice relative to automobile. In
a sense, the same relative value scale seems to govern all cases (although
different juries are involved); for example, with death values above temporary
injury but below permanent major injury, different "multipliers" apply, that
is, somehow, malpractice injuries are "worth" more than twice those that
occur in automobiles.
The two analyses just described cast great doubt on the lawyers'
hypothesis of selection based on unobserved severity. No doubt, attorneys
(and clients) select which cases go forward to trial, rather than being settled or
dropped without payment. But it does not appear that they do so on the basis
of unobserved severity. Rather, we hypothesize the influence of an
unobserved, multiplicative factor or factors, such as sympathy for the plaintiff.
This possibility brings us back to the doctors' hypothesis.
B. The Doctors' Sympathy, Antipathy, or Deep Pockets Theory
The doctors hypothesize that they fare worse in objectively similar cases
because of non-legitimate, subjective factors. That is, that juries are unduly
generous because of some composite ofjuries' sympathy for injured patients,
103. In statistical jargon, it would have been a source of "standard omitted variable bias."
104. Omitting a variable results in biased coefficients for included variables that are correlated
with the excluded variable. Moreover, if there were missing, unobserved variables that were more
influential for malpractice than for automobile, then the R' would be lower for the malpractice
regression than for the automobile regression because the observed variables would account for less
of the observed variation in awards. See G. S. Maddala, Econometrics 155-57 (J. Wylie, 1977).
105. T-statistics tended to be higher in the automobile regression, but this is a result of a larger
sample size.
106. Results in the government and products cases were very similar. Again, to conserve space,
they are not presented.
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS ON AWARDS BY CASE TYPE
Explanatory Variables Auto Cases* Medical Malpractice*
Intercept 4.04' (0.11) 8.64' (1.71)
Time 0.004 (0.011) -0.003 (0.022)
Injury level 1 - 1L.00 (0.32) - 1.22 c  (0.70)
Injury level 2 -0.43 (0.29) -0.93 (0.58)
Injury level 3 -0.09 (0.27) -0.20 (0.53)
Injury level 4 0.56' (0.30) 0.55 (0.46)
Injury level 5 1.34' (0.44) 1.20' (0.37)
Injury scale missing -0.69 (0.42) - (-)
Injury index 0.44' (0.06) 0.15 (0.13)
Injury aggravated pre-exist condition -0.09 (0.08) 0.007 (0.18)
Original number of plaintiffs -0.10, (0.03) -0.10 (0.10)
Original number of defendants 0.19, (0.037) 0.009 (0.040)
Medical expense 0.33' (0.02) 0.26' (0.06)
Medical expense missing 3.22' (0.22) 2.55' (0.59)
Wage loss 0.07' (0.02) 0.10 (0.06)
Wage loss missing 0.52' (0.19) 0.46 (0.71)
Newborn -0.95 (0.74) 1.17' (0.44)
Age 1-10 -0.47b (0.23) 0.55 (0.45)
Age 11-17 -0.18 (0.18) 0.46 (0.41)
Age 18-35 -0.08 (0.13) 0.34 (0.27)
Age 36-50 -0.03 (0.14) 0.14 (0.28)
Age 51-64 0.02 (0.14) 0.31 (0.29)
Age missing -0.29' (0.15) 0.21 (0.31)
Female -0.09 (0.06) 0.10 (0.13)
Sex missing -0.18 (0.21) -0.26 (0.32)
Non-white 0.37 b  (0.18) -0.12 (0.27)
Race Missing 0.25' (0.08) 0.44b (0.21)
Separated (not married) -0.22 (0.14) -0.50' (0.30)
Married status missing -0.02 (0.08) -0.05 (0.18)
Non-professional job -0.09 (0.10) -0.38 (0.25)
Job missing -0.26 b  (0.12) -0.58b (0.28)
Not working -0.08 (0.09) 0.19 (0.19)
Employment missing 0.03 (0.10) 0.33 (0.23)
% of negligence -0.01, (0.001) -0.02' (0.004)
% of negligence missing - 1.21' (0.59) 0.49 (1.30)
Settle 0.29b (0.15) 0.19 (0.21)
Loss consortium 0.14 (0.19) 0.20 (0.23)
Federal court 0.84' (0.31) 0.21 (0.57)
Kansas City, Missouri -0.87' (0.25) -0.29 (0.31)
Kansas City, Kansas -0.65b (0.27) -0.07 (0.40)
California -0.44' (0.15) -0.70' (0.19)
Illinois -0.90, (0.17) 0.23 (0.33)
f2 0.52 0.51
Sample Size 2,393 426
* Estimated by Ordinary least Squares (T-statistics in parentheses).
a. Significant at 0.01 critical level
b. Significant at 0.05 critical level
c. Significant at 0.10 critical level
[Vol. 54: No. I
Page 5: Winter 1991]
antipathy to well-heeled physicians, and the additional deep pocket of liability
insurance. 0 7 Thus, systematic bias makes malpractice cases "worth" more
simply by virtue of being malpractice cases, regardless of other factors. This
hypothesis is not without appeal. It is plausible that jurors would sympathize
more with injured patients or consumers than with injured drivers: motorists
seem to control their own destiny, whereas patients are given a surgical
operation and consumers a finished product on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.108
Moreover, as already noted, even neutral observers have concluded that a
defendant's deep pockets may affect awards, although jurors are in legal
theory not informed about how deep different pockets are. To varying
degrees, legal theory and common sense hold such motivations illegitimate.
Compensation is supposed to be based on need for recompense, not
emotional appeals.
The hypothesis is thus quite plausible, but what evidence supports the
physicians' view? First, all three of our case types with deep pocket de-
fendants did have higher awards. Second, the plaintiffs' lawyers' explanation
of unobserved severity as the reason for award differentials is not persuasive,
as just discussed; and the sympathy, antipathy, or deep pocket theory does
better explain these results. Third, holding type of case constant, the win
percentage generally rises with severity of nonfatal injury, which is consistent
with sympathy for needy plaintiffs. Yet we know of no direct evidence of
systematic sympathy, as opposed to occasional, anecdotal instances.
However, the theory that systematic sympathy (or other bias) depends
merely on the nature of the defendant seems implausible. First, the
hypothesized style of sympathy should apply across the board. Not only
should it encourage juries to award higher damages but also to find liability
more often to begin with (a non-zero award is needed to help the sympathetic
plaintiff or punish the defendant).' 0 9 Yet, the plaintiffs' winning percentage
is, on its face, unsympathetically lower for malpractice and products liability
107. Other subjective influences might also be hypothesized, but these three seem to be the main
ones.
108. One might note, further, that because nearly everyone has himself at some point made a
mistake behind the wheel, jurors plausibly also empathize more with defendant drivers than with
defendant doctors. Antipathy could also arise in the high-award types of cases because of the failure
of the pre-existing relationship of such plaintiffs and defendants. An underappreciated psychological
truth is that a failed relationship or lapse of trust engenders the harshest feelings, as divorce lawyers
can verify. Such antipathy could make such plaintiffs more likely to hold out for trial and possible
vindication---even if the chance of success is low-and juries could share it in awarding damages.
Malpractice cases are the strongest example of this hypothesized form of antipathy, for trust is the
essence of the doctor-patient relationship. To a lesser degree, consumers also buy safety in reliance
on manufacturers' products, and have an ongoing relationship with their governments, albeit
sometimes one with low expectations. In contrast, drivers' previous relationships with other drivers
is transitory and often competitive.
109. Compare Jeffrey W. Jacobson, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System, 263 J Am Med Ass'n
3320, 3324 (April 25, 1990) (speculative to blame juries for being more generous than legal rules in
malpractice cases where defendants win most cases). Across-the-board sympathy should also affect
the value of all malpractice injuries, regardless of the stage of resolution, a hypothesis untestable by
our data.
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cases than for automobile cases (Table 2). 110 From the doctors' perspective,
one can assert that the observed win rate is low because lawyers bring very
weak cases to trial, given that it is so easy to win normal cases. However, this
reasoning is tortured and there is no corroborating evidence that this is so."l
There are also other reasons to believe that most malpractice cases (for
example) are not particularly weak and juries are not biased in favor of finding
liability: (1) a thorough review of malpractice litigation in one state found no
evidence of such bias; 1 2 (2) at least three reviews of malpractice insurance
claims show that legal results relate to medical judgments about the quality of
care given and the avoidability of the injury that occurred;" t 3 and (3) if
malpractice (and products) injuries were so easy to win, one would not expect
to see such a low proportion of medical injury brought to litigation-certainly
relative to automobile torts-nor so many potential malpractice claims
rejected by lawyers.' 14
Second, if plaintiffs could automatically collect double on all winning
malpractice cases, one would expect a less skewed distribution ofjury awards.
Malpractice cases (for example) are skewed toward high-severity, high award
cases; if it were easy to win, one would expect more small cases to go to trial.
High litigation costs, with a large fixed-cost component, could prevent this.
But the latter raises a third point: if it were easier to persuade juries of
malpractice liability, one would expect litigation costs to be lower rather than
higher. Fourth, although the finding that severity of injury relates to
probability of winning superficially suggests an influence of sympathy, the
severity influence seems to be independent of case type, not related to it.
Finally, there are simpler explanations available: the law of malpractice
and products liability is indeed more favorable to defendants, which should
make it harder to win such cases. Perhaps lawyers' negotiations in settlement
should still make the win ratio 50:50, but there are reasons to expect deviation
from this theoretical prediction. On balance, the hypothesis of across-the-
110. See also sources cited in notes 58-59 above.
11. This study cannot objectively determine meritoriousness because we have no way to
measure the validity of a case independent of its jury's ruling on liability. In general, doctors
probably overemphasize the errors made by the legal system on liability. See Jacobson, 263 J Am
Med Ass'n 3320 (cited in 109); note 113 and accompanying text.
112. See Metzloff, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 82-84 (cited in note 25).
113. See Thomas M. Julian, et al, Investigation of Obstetric Malpractice Closed Claims: Profile of Event, 2
Am J Perinatology 320 (1985); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Laurence J. Tancredi & Daniel S. Gaylin,
Obstetrics and Malpractice: Evidence on the Performance of a Selective No-Fault System, 265 J Am Med Ass'n
2835 (June 5, 1991) (liability payment twice as likely for malpractice claims on list predefined as
medically avoidable as for claims not on list); Sloan & Hoerger, J Risk & Uncertainty (cited in note
49).
114. See Danzon, Medical Malpractice at 20-25 (cited in note 15) (ratio of malpractice claims to
hospital injuries in high-claims state of California between 1:10 and 1:5); All-Industry Research
Advisory Council, Attorney Involvement at 9-11 (cited in note 19) (lower percentage of families see
lawyers after medical than automobile accidents). See also Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical
Malpractice Legal System at 97-100 (cited in note 20) (rejections by attorneys); Sloan & Hsieh, 24 L &
Soc'y Rev at Table 2 (cited in note 83) (malpractice claimants received payment in 80% of cases pre.
suit, 43% after suit and before verdict, but only in 22% of cases decided at verdict; vast majority
settled at the pre-verdict stage).
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board sympathy for patient plaintiffs and antipathy to doctors and other deep
pockets is not persuasive.
C. A Combined Interpretation: Sympathy-Based Selection
We conclude that the plaintiffs' lawyers are right to emphasize selection
but the doctors are right that sympathy and other subjective factors are a basis
for selection. We hypothesize that all "pools" of injuries-from malpractice,
automobile accidents, and other causes-contain cases of varying degrees of
sympathy. Selection occurs across all case types at every stage of the legal
process, but necessarily plays a larger role where liability is intrinsically
harder to prove and where trial entails especially high costs, as for
malpractice. That is, not every malpractice injury is inherently more
sympathetic (nor every doctor more antipathetic), but malpractice cases going
to litigation and ultimately to trial are selected to feature such subjective
factors,' 15 ones not captured by our quantitative methods.
What (unobserved) characteristics drive this selection process? Sympathy
and antipathy indeed seem very plausible factors. So does severity of injury,
for two forms of which our analyses have controlled. The deep-pocket
explanation seems more plausible as a matter of attorneys' selection (based
on the extent of insurance coverage or attachable assets discovered in
preparation for trial) than as an explanation of jury response to the
circumstances of a case. Selection makes sense, for plaintiffs' lawyers are very
unlikely to incur the expense of trial if probable damages exceed the depth of
the defendants' pockets, including insurance. So all trials are likely to involve
"deep enough" pockets."16
Jury bias based on deep pockets makes less sense: First, the straight-
forward depth-of-pocket model does not explain the relative ranking of
automobile, government, products liability, and malpractice cases. The latter
three indeed have deep pockets, but the very deepest would seem to be large
defendants in products liability cases, followed by government, and only then
by insured hospitals or doctors. This is not the order indicated by the
observed awards, however, in either raw data (Figure 1) or adjusted for other
factors (Table 1). Moreover, within the malpractice category, doctors bear a
much higher liability burden than hospitals, as measured by insurance
115. Plausibly, people injured by doctors have a harder time recognizing that their injury results
from substandard care rather than from their underlying condition, and they face more of an uphill
battle to show liability. Hence, the process disproportionately selects the more vengeful-and
monetarily needy-plaintiffs right from the start. Plaintiffs' lawyers' expert counsel again weed out
cases before bringing lawsuits and further select for trial cases known to be likely to win big awards
within each category of injury severity.
116. It is a stylized fact that virtually all doctors and hospitals are insured, with liability limits
routinely in the millions of dollars, US Gov't Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice: Insurance Costs Increased
by Varied Among Physicians and Hospitals (September 1986) (GAO/HRD-86-112), whereas drivers are
often uninsured or covered for low levels. Statutorily required automobile coverage may be as low as
$10,000 per injury (in six states); the highest required is $50,000 (one state). Insurance Information
Institute, Insurance Facts: 1986-87, Property/Casualty Fact Book 104 (1986). However, no lawyer with a
quadriplegic client seems likely to go to trial against an insurance attorney obligated to pay a
maximum of $10,000 or even $50,000.
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premiums, whereas hospital enterprises clearly have deeper pockets,
especially beyond the limits of purchased insurance coverage." 7 Doctors pay
more because they are, rightly, perceived to be the primary medical
decisionmakers. Second, juries are apt to expect that ample insurance (or
company or government self-insurance) will pay in all personal injury cases,
thus equalizing the perceived depth of pocket. Plaintiffs' lawyers are quite
talented in somehow conveying the fact of insurance to the jurors in the
courtroom, despite its inadmissibility as formal evidence. Moreover, in this
mgdia age, it seems highly likely that at least one or two jurors will know
enough to educate fellow jurors, regardless of events in the courtroom. For
these reasons, we would downplay deep pockets as an explanatory factor in
jury behavior.
In addition to sympathy and antipathy, there may be another important
type of idiosyncratic, jury-affecting factor-namely, the relative litigation
quality of the two parties (for example, how good an impression on a jury
plaintiff and defendant are expected to make as witnesses) and their legal
teams. As with sympathy, this is an unobserved characteristic.
Finally, we note that a better investigation of the interactions of selection
and sympathy must await further study. What is needed is either a broader
statistical study that can analyze both settlements and verdicts across case
types, an analysis of the relative merits of actual verdicts with regard to
liability and damages, or controlled experiments in jury decisionmaking, or
some combination of these approaches.
VII
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study analyzed the differences in personal injury awards between
automobile and "deep-pocket" defendants, especially in medical malpractice
cases. Six conclusions are particularly relevant to the legal policy debate:
First, we found large and statistically significant differentials injury awards for
personal injuries between automobile cases (lowest) and medical malpractice
(highest), even after adjusting for characteristics known to influence verdicts.
Adjusted malpractice awards are almost three times larger than automobile
awards. It is important to understand what causes these striking differentials
in order to know whether they are a problem that merits attention through
tort reform or otherwise.
Second, the observed differences in awards were not shown to grow over
time, after controlling for other factors. Thus, award differentials seem to
117. For example, Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care Is the Important
Standard, 49 L & Contemp Probs 321, 322 (Spring 1986) (For 1984, physicians bore about two thirds
of total cost for malpractice coverage.). Moreover, prior analysis of Florida malpractice insurance
claims and of Florida and Kansas City jury verdicts found that payments were lower, not higher,
when a hospital was listed as a defendant than when no hospital was listed. Sloan & Hsieh, 24 L &
Soc'y Rev at 1021 (cited in note 83). With regard to probability of winning any payment, the latter
analysis found that the win rate was lower for Florida malpractice claims with hospital defendants,
but higher for Kansas City and Florida jury verdicts.
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have been no more and no less justification for malpractice-specific tort
reforms in the 1980s (when many reforms were generic) than in the 1970s
(when malpractice-only reforms predominated)." 8
Third, despite the larger verdicts in malpractice cases (for example),
attorneys representing injured patients do not seem to be earning excessive
compensation, "quasi-rents" in economic terminology. At least, the net value
of malpractice cases does not seem out of line: the plaintiffs' win rate in
malpractice is lower than in any of the other three types of cases examined,
only half as high as for automobile; and legal costs appear to be higher for
malpractice litigation than for automobile cases, more than twice automobile
cases. Thus the net expected value of these cases seems to be roughly the
same. This finding supports the theoretical expectation that lawyers equalize
returns across case types and greatly undercuts the rationale for fee limits that
do not recognize cost differentials (as most statutes do not) or that apply only
to malpractice cases (as most statutes do)." 19
The lower win rate in malpractice could suggest that too many less-
meritorious cases go to trial, as doctors would argue, or instead that
malpractice is intrinsically more difficult to prove and more vigorously
defended by doctors, as plaintiffs' lawyers would contend. We cannot directly
analyze these competing hypotheses using available data, although there are
indications that legal determinations are in reasonable accord with medical
standards in malpractice cases. The economic model of dispute resolution
suggests that possible reasons for the lower win rate include differential risk
aversion as between the parties and various asymmetries in the parties'
expected gains and losses from trial.
Fourth, we reject one superficially plausible hypothesis about why juries
decide to pay more for malpractice-that is, the plaintiffs' attorneys' argument
that they select cases for trial that have suffered legitimately more severe
injuries, just in ways not observable by analysis, for example, more severe
pain and suffering. The law instructs juries to award more in such cases, and
if the selection-by-unobserved-severity hypothesis were verified, no reform
would be needed to address the differentials. In fact, however, two additional
types of regressions (using death cases only and stratification of the sample by
case type) failed to find support for this hypothesis, and we are reasonably
confident in rejecting it.
Fifth, the remaining explanation for the differentials is that juries
sometimes respond emotionally, awarding some objectively similar cases
higher damages than others. Hypothesized factors include sympathy for
certain plaintiffs, antipathy for certain defendants, higher quality legal cases in
some instances, and, possibly, knowledge that certain defendants (or their
insurers) have "deep pockets" and so can afford high awards. We suggest
that some cross-cutting factor like sympathy must be influencing some
118. See Bovbjerg, 22 UC Davis L Rev at 543-44 (cited in note 11).
119. Id at 522-23, 544.
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awards. Sympathy can have a large influence because the law gives so much
leeway to juries to go beyond "legitimate" (and observable) factors in their
decisionmaking: Juries can find for or against any plaintiff, with virtually any
amount of damages, with little or no explanation; the rules of damages are
very vague; and legal process gives reviewing judges no formal way to assure
consistency of results in similar cases. That sympathy (and similar factors)
plays some role is only common sense; just what role it plays is more
problematic.
Sixth, there is no direct evidence on just how sympathy (or other similar
factors) affects awards-either from this study or, to our knowledge, from
elsewhere. The physicians' perspective is that sympathy (and other such
factors) operates by case type, that is, that juries are intrinsically biased in
malpractice cases, which therefore receive higher awards across the board for
cases of objectively similar merit. This across-the-board sympathy should also
raise plaintiffs' win percentage, other things equal; it does not, according to
this theory, only because attorneys proceed with so many less meritorious
cases. If verified, the across-the-board sympathy hypothesis would justify
malpractice-specific reforms. Although the hypothesis cannot be entirely
ruled out, it seems an oversimplification. For example, our regression
showed that probability of plaintiffs winning rose with higher observed
severity of injury. This finding is consistent with a sympathy effect, but one
that operates independently of case type, for which the analysis controlled. It
is also consistent with greater investment by plaintiffs' attorneys in high-
severity cases, or with more talented plaintiffs' attorneys specializing in high-
severity cases.' 20 If the hypothesis is not correct, then malpractice-specific
reform needs to be justified on other grounds, such as errors in findings of
liability or the very high costs of malpractice litigation.
In place of the lawyers' hypothesis of severity-based selection (which we
reject) and the doctors' hypothesis of across-the-board sympathy (which we
find unpersuasive), we suggest instead a combination of the two-sympathy-
based selection. That is, lawyers choose cases for trial according to their
expert judgment on how juries will respond to various idiosyncrasies of a
case, including relative ability to generate sympathy. The entire injury pool
for each type of case is hypothesized to contain cases that vary from extremely
sympathetic to very unsympathetic, and along other such dimensions as well.
From the pool, relatively few unsympathetic cases go forward for malpractice,
because the likelihood of losing and the cost of litigation are both too high.
The same kinds of high sympathy cases occur and are litigated among
automobile injuries, but high-sympathy cases are more predominant in high-
stakes litigation. Conversely, plaintiffs' lawyers have rejected less sympathetic
malpractice cases, which for automobile injuries they might have taken to a
jury, because these lower-value cases cannot pay their own way where liability
is hard to establish and expensive to litigate.
120. See generally Frank A. Sloan, et al, Winners and Losers: How Medical Malpractice Claims are
Resolved (submitted for publication March 1991).
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This combined hypothesis is certainly plausible and explains many
observed phenomena, although direct verification is desirable. If correct, it
implies that reforms of damages should address not merely malpractice,
products liability, or government cases in isolation but rather the entire legal
approach to ad hoc jury decisionmaking on damages.' 2' Reforms should
make legal rules of damages less vague and more objective, especially with
regard to non-pecuniary damages, giving juries better ways for making
individual valuations and judges better ways for maintaining consistency
across cases. Then, any biases would be less consequential and jury outcomes
would be more predictable for all types of cases, facilitating settlement and
making litigation less expensive.
121. See generally Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev 908 (cited in note 51);
Blumstein, Bovbjerg & Sloan, 8 Yale J Reg 171 (cited in note 53).
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APPENDIX 1
DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT
The data used in this study come from numerous jury verdict reporters
within five separate jurisdictions: Florida; Kansas City, Missouri; Kansas City,
Kansas; San Francisco and several other counties in California; and Cook
County, Illinois. Jury verdict reporters are private publications that
periodically publish summaries of numerous jury verdicts known to the editor,
in a somewhat standardized format.' The reporters used are believed to be
unbiased by selection factors, although the two statewide Florida reporters
clearly contain a lower proportion of all verdicts than do the other reporters,
which cover metropolitan areas. The Florida and Kansas City data, for 1973-
87, were newly collected by this study. Data for the remaining jurisdictions,
which were provided by RAND, cover only 1980-85; other years were not
available at the time of analysis. The data collection instruments and
instructions used for Florida and Kansas City were updated versions of the
RAND forms, and RAND staff helped train the coders used, so the two parts
of the data base are consistent.
Four major categories of personal injury cases were considered. These
were automobile accidents (including all motor vehicles), medical malpractice,
product liability, and personal injury cases involving government defendants
(such as slips and falls on public property). The categories were chosen to
illuminate the "deep pocket" theory of liability and award differentials.
Information was obtained on liability and damages, plaintiff characteristics,
and, to a lesser extent, defendant characteristics. 2 Award amounts cover only
jury verdicts, together with prior settlements by defendants previously
dropped; cases with only settlements are not included. The trial judge's
change in the verdict through additur or remittitur (if any) is normally shown,
but not any change after verdict as a result of settlement or appeal. There is
evidence that a substantial minority of malpractice verdicts are reduced after
verdict, especially for very large verdicts.3
Nationally, the most common type of personal liability case is motor
vehicle accidents. This is also reflected in the available sample. Of 8,388
observations on plaintiffs, 3,778 were in "pure" automobile cases (that case
type only), followed by pure malpractice (1,130 cases), pure government
(599), and pure product liability (348). The remaining cases were various
"hybrids," each being a combination of two or more case types (for example,
an automobile accident with a government driver, malpractice in a public
hospital, or a medical injury claim against a doctor and drug company).
It is worth noting that for about a quarter of the observations medical
expenses were not recorded, and for about half wages were not recorded. To
preserve the sample size while maintaining the information content of these
variables, binary variables were used for missing data, that is, an either/or
indication was used rather than a numerical value. The same procedure was
used for other variables.
1. For a description, see Mark A. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries: Civil Juty Verdicts in Cook
County Appendix A, 59-67 (RAND, 1984).
2. For a longer description, see id at Appendix B, 68-86.
3. See note 86 in main text.
[Vol. 54: No. I
Page 5: Winter 1991]
APPENDIX 2
REGRESSION ANALYSES
In the log-award regression (Table 1, column two), which was estimated by
ordinary-least-squares, the dependent variable is the log of payments awarded
by juries in all cases won. The main independent variable of interest was case
type. Three types of personal injury cases are shown: automobile, product
liability, and government (with medical malpractice the omitted category).
We were mainly interested in the experience of these "pure" case types, and
textual discussion focuses on them. Of course, a smaller number of combined
case types also existed, for example, where a malpractice case was brought
against a government hospital. These "hybrid" cases are difficult to interpret
in isolation but help act as controls.
We used a six-point severity index, from minor injury (injury number 1) to
death (omitted category) at the top of the scale created by RAND. We also
created a composite injury index ("severity"), expressed as a monetary value,
based on the plaintiff's symptoms, and we coded an indication of whether the
injury seemed to aggravate a pre-existing condition.
There are five jurisdictions: Kansas City, Missouri; Kansas City, Kansas;
California (several counties); Illinois (Chicago only); and the state of Florida
(the omitted category).
Two measures of economic loss are included, the log of medical expense
and the log of wage loss, each as given in the jury verdict reporter for its
jurisdiction (data were sometimes missing). There are dummy variables for
six age groups, newborn to age 51-64 (the elderly are the omitted category).
Other plaintiff characteristics include sex (female versus omitted category of
male); race and ethnicity (non-white versus white); marital status (separated
and married status missing as well as unmarried versus married); and
employment status. Other variables relate to the legal posture of the case,
including original number of plaintiffs, original number of defendants,
presence of comparative negligence, extent of negligence (expressed as a
percentage), presence of derivative claims like loss of consortium, settlement
(settlement before jury verdict by a previously joined defendant), and type of
court (federal versus state).
In semilogarithmic regressions, the percent effects (e) of dummy variables
are given by e = 100 1exp(d) - 1 }, where d is the coefficient of the relevant
dummy variable. Percent effects of all dummy variables reported in this
article are based on this transformation.'
In the "probability of plaintiff win" analysis, we regressed the probability
of winning, that is, a finding of liability in favor of the plaintiff, against several
variables. As with the log award regression, we focus on the influence of
"pure" case types, omitting discussion of the hybrid cases. The independent
variables used are very similar to those in the log awards regression (Table 1).
But some variables were omitted: medical expense, wage loss, age, sex and
1. See Robert Halvorsen & Raymond Paimquist, The Interpretation of Dummy Variables in
Semilogarithmic Equations, 70 Am Econ Rev 474 (1980).
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other plaintiff characteristics are used as proxies for the plaintiff's loss, which
in legal theory should not affect the probability of winning, so they were
excluded from the probability regression. We did incorporate severity of
injury in this regression because some prior analyses suggest that it may be
more difficult to find negligence in cases of low severity.2 The injury index,
on the other hand, is not included because the injury scale is a sufficient proxy
for this potential effect.
The probability regression was estimated by maximum likelihood probit.
Marginal effects in the probit model used are obtained from a transformation
of the regression coefficient. For continuous variables, the probit marginal
effects are given by aP/3Xi = f(b'X)b,, where b is the vector of regression
coefficients, X is the vector of explanatory variables, Xi is the continuous
variable in question, bi is its corresponding coefficient, and f is the normal
density function. 3 For dummy variables, marginal effects are obtained from
the difference between the predicted probability at d = 1, with the predicted
probability corresponding to the omitted category (calculated at the sample
means).
2. Patricia M. Danzon, The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims 50-51 (RAND, 1980); Patricia
M. Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J
Legal Stud 361-62 (1982).
3. See G. S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics 21 (Cambridge U
Press, 1983).
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